Giulio Marini
To fight for academic freedom (AF), and to use AF for engagement in intellectual battles nowadays appears as virtuous as ever. One may believe that what is needed is simply to recover some capacity by universities to express critical capacity. If I focus my attention on the staff side of universities, a fair approximation would be that of reevaluating the academics as public intellectuals (Posner 2003; Kennedy 2015). However, one should have ample academic freedom to be in the position to exercise public intellectual functions. The more AF is under threat, the more we need it. This tautology deserves a definition of AF.
In essence, academic freedom is imperilled whenever certain possibilities are denied. In this sense, AF is under threat when negative freedom (freedom from external constraints – Berlin 1958) is diminished. AF, when present, enhances the possibility for universities to nurture society at large, with public intellectuals serving as case studies. Both restrictions on AF (actions affecting academics, institutions, and students – limiting their possibilities) and externalities of AF (actions derived from free inquiry by academics and students, including controversy, sensitive innovation, and proposing rallies about issues) define AF-in-the-making. Hence, academic freedom is primarily a tension between universities and the society they operate within – a tension about the extent to which, and under what forms, academic freedom should exist.
This definition aligns with the concept of partial autonomy (Hofstadter 1955). This interplay is arguably contestable, meaning that societies and universities determine what is allowed and what is not allowed within universities themselves. In this relationship, the current scenario we observe in terms of populism, distrust of science, "cancel culture," post-truth etc. seems like society closing the door on AF. In other words, AF appears under threat as long as closeness prevails over openness: in the tug-of-war between universities (presumably preferring hands-off conditions) and their respective societies (preferring at times hands-on control over universities), the latter pulls the most. If we reduce universities to academic staff alone (ignoring the relevant contributions of students in this function), a pulling force for universities is the commitment to having academics as public intellectuals: a sort of club of diverse free thinkers who commit themselves to discussing specific issues openly. Academic staff are subsidized by taxpayers to perform this function, as one of the many roles academic employees may embody (if universities are private, these intellectual employees might operate under philanthropic tutelage).
Thus, I restrict my analysis to the interplay between the extent to which academics prefer to engage with public intellectual functions and the respective societal values or contextual conditions.
The stake of contested protection
Academic freedom may be on the verge of demise. The imbalance between protection and privileges for academics on one hand, and political, economic, and social constraints on the other, could generate a situation that is fourfold, resulting from the combination of academics' willingness or unwillingness to publicly engage with sensitive issues (i.e., acting as public intellectuals) and society's willingness or unwillingness to permit such a function (see Table 1 for further details).
On a general basis, a country that allows Academic Freedom within its borders is likely to have a greater likelihood of developing innovative solutions in any area it is committed to prioritizing. A country might, for instance, deem nuclear and/or renewable energy crucial, while disregarding certain medical applications due to ethical concerns. However, the same country may also dismiss free analysis in history or social sciences altogether – possibly because it is an authoritarian regime with an official truth about history, encompassing morality, social order, ideology, and so forth. In these cases, the authors of official truth may be external to universities or may even be academics themselves; however, they are unlikely to be free to investigate beyond a restricted scope. Walking on eggshells would be a fair description of this situation. There are numerous ways to incentivize academics to fulfill their expected roles without trespassing the boundaries of permission – physical coercion being only the most clumsy option. Subtle and nuanced tactics may be more than enough to trigger careerist behaviours, for example (Oleksiyenko & Ruan 2019). This is not a negligible factor in approaching the question of how a state concedes Academic Freedom only to a limited extent.
Academic freedom, viewed from the perspective of the awarding-freedom player (typically a state in the contemporary world), carries the risk of allowing uncomfortable truths to be told. This is a risk known beforehand and accepted by the state – at least to some extent. What is more intriguing is that such uncomfortable truth may be legitimately diffused publicly. Another level at play is that of discussing issues, assuming truth is to be sought rather than broadcasted, paving the way for an expansion of audience that can contribute to defining truth. Additionally, this latter possibility is known and accepted beforehand if academic freedom is accepted in a given country. Truth and its dissemination are funded by state resources and may potentially run counter to state advantages or a specific understanding of them (e.g., against Conservatives or Progressives, not necessarily referring to strictly political parties). The question thus becomes: why does academic freedom exist? In other words: why should a prince pay full board to a page who uses their position to entertain bystanders by saying "The Prince has no clothes!"? A prima facie answer might be that the Prince (a Philosopher-Enlightened one, likely) will allow this to happen because they assume that any remark is potentially useful and usable by themselves; they will also counter-ask about the page's nudity; and they will declare that roles should not be confused. None of these critiques necessarily undermine anyone's dignity or legitimation.
This Philosopher-Enlightened Prince/ss seems to be enacting a democratic, Socratic arena. This argument aligns with those proposing liberal democracies as champions of ensuring academic freedom (Cole 2017). The more a political system and its society at large allow academic freedom, the stronger, wealthier, and more just that society will be (Pusser et al. 2012). On the other hand, if academic freedom is too limited or absent entirely in society, research becomes stifled, leading to competitive backwardness. Poor academic freedom also undermines the next generation's true potential. Rigidity blocks innovation, but rigidity often sets in only after political breakthroughs have already occurred as a lag reaction.
The interplay between society and academics: pathways of engagement or disengagement
Academic Freedom as agency and main biases
Once I have defined academic freedom as partial autonomy under recurrent negotiation, one can see this partial liberty as a political game with external forces that academia cannot eschew from playing (Haskell 1996). Therefore, any actual situation is suitable for having an agentic idea of academic freedom. In this light, universities do not simply witness a fall and a more or less sudden deterioration of their own academic freedom – they can to some extent act in maintaining it or allowing it to decline. These changes likely occur in accordance with the roles that both society and academics themselves attribute to universities. This aspect can overcome the impression that academia is a passive player undergoing losses in AF. Academic freedom necessarily defines questionable zones in relation to how to express stances, about what to discuss, and with what mandate (why). While this is also a matter of the ethos of the profession, much of a single given case depends on its given context and the respective interplay. Much of everyday university life, including the most sensitive questions, can be seen as an agentic condition in relation to academic freedom. For instance, should we allow/support a manifestation against the government that is only lukewarm towards #BlackLivesMatter? Should this happen inside or even outside the campus? What should universities do about notable founding former scholars or alumni who supported slavery or eugenics in their times? And what about tracking down self-censorship?
The possibility to engage is possibly biased by the opinions academics themselves may have about the extent to which they can engage (for a cross-sectional study, see Norris 2023). Defining whether there is or is not academic freedom in a given situation is not simple. We need to account for the possibility that academic staff may complain surreptitiously against the erosion of AF itself. This might be the problem of a false positive – a perspective seldom considered. This possibility may occur whenever academics express concerns against supposed threats, although those threats are instead exaggerated. I agree with some authors (e.g., Collini 2017) that the era of denouncing the "university in ruins" is itself overcome. An example of false positive might be that of academics being reluctant to accept new forms of tighter accountability, more competitive access to resources, and/or conditional funding agency priorities. Although many aspects of contemporary higher education systems are potentially detrimental to AF, academics may exaggerate concerns, even unconsciously and genuinely.
It is perhaps even more interesting to consider the other way around bias: the more academics do not complain, the more they might be in a position not to complain, at least keeping a fair degree of personal safety (e.g., to keep one's employment and career perspectives intact, which are as relevant as avoiding legal action). This latter situation might be a false negative: there is a problem, but it is not detected, or if detected it is not discussed publicly. Or even though discussed it is not faced actively and effectively. In this case, engagement could be represented by complaining about poor leeway in engagement – a case of attempting to re-establish AF, or deuter-academic freedom one may say.
Academic freedom has the remarkable problem of not only accounting for the context and its features but also for the difficulty in cleansing an actual state of conditions.
A typology
Table 1 below presents two possible ideal types of Academic Freedom generated by the two main actors: societal values (including political powers, economic forces, and public opinion) and the academic staff themselves, who reflect on the possibility of engaging with social issues publicly. The former may be inclined to provide protection or be reluctant to give (or keep) it. Societal values, however, can vary across society or over time, as seen in Osler's (2007) analysis of English civic universities in modern times, which challenges Collini's (2006) thesis about the differences between English and Scottish understandings of universities. In the typology called Activism, both society at large and academics believe that it is appropriate for academics to take on public intellectual roles, potentially trespassing campus boundaries to engage with wider publics.
Table 1. A basic typology for social engagement by academics
|
| Academic staff | |
|
| Advocating actively more public voice | Protecting the profession without relevant public engagement |
Societal Values | Inclined to provide protection | Activism, golden times Academics are Public Intellectuals and are recognized & listened | Ivory Times Academics might engage, but prefer staying tranquil and neutral towards social issues |
Reluctant to give / keep protection and privileges | Conflict Academics try to be Public Intellectuals but are opposed
| Resilience via hibernation Academics renounce any Public Intellectual functions |
Source: own elaboration
The combination of benign societal values and tranquil universities results in the "Ivory Time" quadrant. Academics enjoy their protection and privileges, considering themselves as bearers of rights by nature or as unquestionable assets. Although they may discuss social changes or support the status quo, there is consensus about their roles, leading to substantial non-engagement. In this quadrant, Academic Freedom is likely untold and uncontested, unless societies view them as detached from reality.
This second quadrant can develop into two scenarios: Conflict or Hibernation. In the first scenario, although academics talk about academic freedom as usual, they primarily express discomfort with their role in society. Societal expectations limit their ability to operate publicly, unlike the expectation that they should be a cornerstone for social change. Societies in this condition may actively scrutinize academics to transform and straighten them towards their "real job." In this quadrant, academic staff become more accountable in areas where public and dominant discourse deem them useful. They may even lose their civil servant status and become employees with "employers" representing the university's interests. Respective means to achieve goals (e.g., top-notch research and international curricula) may not diminish, but societal values prescribe which goals are important and which are not. In this sense, academics are useful as long as they achieve entitled goals.
The difference between the third and fourth quadrants lies in academics' stance on their own role. If they believe they have a broader role in society, they will enter into conflict. Otherwise, they will remain silent. In the Conflict quadrant, academics contest which goals universities should prioritize while trying to discuss specific issues of the day.
In the last typology, academic freedom is under threat, but there is no open debate about the issue. Societal values expect that academics will limit or preserve limited degrees of protection if they become public intellectuals. This role expected of universities may lead to a reduced contribution in other areas, such as lower-quality research or less inspiring teaching, but this cannot be generalized. It is also important to note that academics may not lose privileges; instead, they may remain or even increase in privilege (high salaries, steeped careers for those who show adherence and loyalty, secure employment, and high social prestige). These factors can serve as rewards for those who accept a limited role.
Assuming that academics are inclined to preserve what they have, resilience might take the form of compliance rather than resistance. It is also possible that academia may perform lip service, preserving its capacity for critical inspiration to society as long as conditions remain unchanged. The difference with the previous typology lies in the dominant option by the academic system to not challenge society. Resilience, Hibernation, or Somnolence (Rüegg 1992) synthesizes this condition. Although critical thought is confined, a function remains in place: an implicit contribution to maintaining the status quo that may please the powers that exist. It is not impossible that this condition could lead to irreversible ankylosis in the long term or that public intellectuals as we define them in Western Europe may only exist nominally (Marini & Oleksiyenko, 2022).
From this perspective, academic freedom appears enlarged in its implications for societies under political, social, and cultural dimensions. Academics as public intellectuals are a resource that can only generate a contribution to society under certain conditions. Notably, academics can only partially shape the society they work for if they truly wish to do so. The modes, conditions, and outcomes they can provide when Academic Freedom is vivid enough are mostly a tale yet to be fully unfolded in the global community studying the academic profession.
Giulio Marini, University of Catania: giulio.marini@unict.it
References:
Berlin, I. (1958). Two concepts of liberty. Inaugural lecture before the University of Oxford on 31st October 1958
Cole, J.R. (2017). Academic Freedom as an Indicator of a Liberal Democracy. Globalizations, 14(6), 862-868. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1325169
Collini S. (2017). Speaking of Universities. Verso, London.
Collini S. (2006). Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain. Oxford University Press.
Haskell, T.L. (1996). “Justifying the Rights of Academic Freedom in the Era of ‘Power/Knowledge’”. In Menand L. (Ed.) (1996) The Future of Academic Freedom. University of Chicago Press.
Hofstadter, R. & Metzger, W.P. (1955). The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kennedy, M.D. (2015). Globalizing Knowledge: Intellectuals, Universities, and Publics in Transformation. Stanford University Press.
Marini, G., & Oleksiyenko, A. (2022). Academic freedom in the re‐imagined post‐Humboldtian Europe. Higher Education Quarterly, 76(3), 513-520. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12405
Norris, P. (2023). Cancel culture: Myth or reality?. Political studies, 71(1), 145-174. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211037023
Oleksiyenko, A., & Ruan, N. (2019). Intellectual leadership and academic communities: Issues for discussion and research. Higher Education Quarterly, 73(4), 406-418. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12199
Osler, A. (2007). The Rise of Public Lecturing in England. Trafford Publishing.
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Pusser B., Kempner K., Marginson S., Ordorika I. (2012). Universities and the public sphere: Knowledge creation and state building in the era of globalization. Routledge.
Rüegg, W. (1992). 'Epilogue: the Rise of Humanism. In H. de Ridder-Symoens (Eds.), A History of the University in Europe (pp. 442-468). Cambridge University Press.
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